





The purpose of this paper is to discuss the policy and legal problems with
regard to foreign acquisitions of United States banks. Some of these
problems are the same as for acquisitions of other types of businesses; other
problems are quite special to the acquisition of banks. The emphasis in the
paper will be on the acquisition of banks owned by holding companies,
which is how most large (and many smaller) United States banks are orga-
nized.
There are many common sense business reasons why foreign banks are
interested in acquiring banks in the United States. For example, customers
of foreign banks are expanding into the United States and it may be consid-
ered important by foreign banks to be able to provide service for their cus-
tomers directly rather than through other banks which are competitors or
potential competitors. Acquisition, even at a high premium, is often
believed to be the cheapest and least risky way to enter a new market. Fur-
thermore, stock prices in the United States appear to be low in comparison
to book asset values, which may make acquisitions, including of banks,
appear to be an attractive form of expansion for both domestic and foreign
companies. For foreign acquirers there are also other attractions. The dol-
lar appears to be cheaper than it has been with respect to most European
currencies, and investment in the United States provides an important form
of political diversification of investment risk because the United States'
political and economic systems are stable and still relatively friendly to cap-
italism.
Moreover, foreign banks have a special, very important, economic incen-
tive for acquiring United States banks instead of organizing new banks.
* Messrs. Herzel and Rosenberg practice law in Chicago.
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Legal rules in the United States severely restrict the extent to which United
States banks and most other United States corporations can compete for
bank acquisitions in the United States. These legal restrictions on United
States banks and other potential United States acquirers could make the
expected return on investment to a foreign acquirer of a United States bank
appear to be higher than from other types of investment in the United
States and elsewhere with the same amount of risk. Competition among
foreign acquirers and legally eligible United States non-bank acquirers
(including ordinary stock market purchases for investment) should have a
tendency to reduce the expected return, but the elimination by law of their
most knowledgeable and effective United States competitors for acquisi-
tions must be viewed by foreign acquirers as a very important favorable
factor. '
There are many difficulties for foreigners in making acquisitions in the
United States which further reduce competition for such acquisitions and
may increase the expected rewards for successful acquirers. The greatest
difficulties are the federal and state regulatory structures which require the
prior approval of regulatory agencies for acquisitions of banks.
'In an efficient securities market, there is some mystery about why acquirers are Willing to
pay premiums over market price for acquisitions since stock prices should reflect accurately
the values of companies. For a description of the theory and the empirical evidence support-
ing the hypothesis that securities markets are efficient see LORIE & HAMILTON, THE STOCK
MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 70-98 (1973); Fame, Efficient Capital Markets. .4 Review
of the Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FINANCE 383 (1970); Jensen, Capital Markets. Theory
and Evidence, 3 BELL J. ECON. MTG. SCI. 357 (1972); Herzel and CoIling, The Chinese Wall
and Conflict of Interest in Banks, 34 Bus. LAW. 73, 94-99 (1978); Saari, The Efficient Capital
Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L.
REV. 1031, 1034-57 (1977). The most satisfactory, although very general, explanation is that
acquirers believe they have some insight into the targets' businesses which will permit them to
operate (or dispose of) these businesses more profitably than present managements. For an
extensive survey of the literature on this subject and the development of an interesting theory
very favorable to tender offers see Easterbrook and Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. - (April 1981). Clearly some
acquirers make unusually high profits on acquisitions and others make mistakes and lose
money. There is statistical evidence, however, that on the average in negotiated acquisitions in
the United States the premiums paid by acquirers reflect all the additional value in the acquisi-
tions above a normal competitive rate of return on investments with the same degree of risk.
Mandelker, Risk and Return. The Case of Merging Firms, I J. FINANCIAL ECON. 303 (1974).
This is consistent with the hypothesis that there is, for practical purposes, perfect competition
among domestic acquirers, exactly what may be lacking in the market for United States banks
when domestic competition is excluded. In unnegotiated tender offers competition is also
often lacking unless there is management resistance sufficient to give the management bargain-
ing power similar to a negotiated acquisition. See Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate
Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Offers, 61 CHI. B. REC. 152 (1979); also published in 3
CORP. L. REv. 107 (1980). In the case of foreign acquirers there is a possibility that the premi-
ums they pay reflect in part the fact that they are willing to accept lower rates of return than
domestic acquirers because after discounting for political risks the expected return to foreign-
ers in their own countries is lower than it appears and lower than in the United States. How-
ever, to the extent that international securities markets are also efficient the attitudes of
foreigners toward political risk should already be reflected in securities prices in the United
States and elsewhere. See Black, The Ins and Outs of Foreign Investment, May/June, 1978,
FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J. 2.
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II. Policy Issues
A. Economic Issues
In general, the purely economic effects of foreign acquisitions should be
beneficial to shareholders of United States companies and for the United
States economy. If an acquisition is at a premium over the market price of
the acquired company's stock (as it almost always is), stockholders benefit
directly from the premium; and, unless the acquirer has made a mistake,
the United States economy benefits because the allocation of economic
resources in the United States is improved. An acquirer motivated by a
desire for economic gain generally could not afford to pay more than the
market price of the stock unless it expected to improve the use of the
acquired company's resources. Although acquirers, like everyone else, are
sometimes wrong, on the average they must be right or else acquisitions
would cease.
Even from a purely economic standpoint, banks are a special case of for-
eign investment. If there were no legal restrictions on domestic banks and
other domestic corporations against acquiring banks in the United States,
then the economic effects of acquisition by foreigners would be the same as
for other foreign acquisitions. However, the severe legal restrictions against
acquisitions of banks by domestic banks and corporations make these con-
clusions less clear. Foreign acquisitions of banks at a premium are proba-
bly, on the average, beneficial to bank shareholders and the economy. But
if domestic banks were permitted to compete for acquisitions, prices to
shareholders and benefits for the United States economy might be much
greater. It is impossible to justify on economic, political or any other
grounds a set of legal rules which may be giving foreign banks sheltered
bargain prices in making acquisitions of United States banks.
The effect of foreign bank acquisitions of United States banks on control
of the United States money supply is probably non-existent or very minor.
Most of the problem is created by the large dollar balances held in foreign
banks abroad, not by foreign bank acquisitions. In general, we probably
have much less control over our money supply than we pretend. 2
B. Political Issues
Most of the negative aspects of foreign investment involve political rather
than economic issues.3 Foreign ownership of companies can reduce or
2For a discussion of the economic effects of foreign investment see Black, The Ins and Outs
ofForeign Investment, May/June, 1978, FINANCIAL ANALYSTS J. 2.
3Since 1977, an Arab group has been attempting to acquire control of Financial General
Bankshares Inc. which owns two small banks in New York (New York City and Albany) and
several banks in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area (total assets, $2.5 million). Until the
price was increased, management resisted the acquisition and there were some legal problems
with the SEC. Management is no longer resisting but the acquisition is still subject to approval
by the Federal Reserve Board and the New York and Maryland banking authorities. There is
some political pressures against the takeover. (New York State Senator Ohrenstein said that
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appear to reduce the United States' complete control over its economy and
political system. Even if the actual amount of foreign control over total
bank assets in the United States is relatively minor, the suspicion that there
is pervasive foreign influence could be very undesirable. On the other
hand, as the Iran crisis has illustrated, there may in some instances be real
strategic advantages in having the power to hold foreign assets hostage.
There is also in the background the belief (which may have no proper
empirical basis) that, despite supervision by bank regulatory agencies, for-
eign ownership is more likely than domestic ownership to result in looting
or other misuse of bank and trust assets. This uneasiness has been rein-
forced by what may be a statistically rare example, the role which Michele
Sindona played in the failure of the Franklin National Bank. This foreign
financier was convicted of, among other things, misappropriating
$15,000,000 in Franklin funds and directing improper foreign currency
speculation that resulted in the bank losing $30,000,000 before its collapse
in 1974.4
"as representatives of their governments" the Arab investors can "draw upon resources and
even laws that take them out of the realm of competition with other banks.") New York
Times, March 27, 1981 § D (Business), at 3, col. 4. The political and social sensitivity of a
change in the control of an important (although not one of the largest) banks in a purely
domestic United States context is illustrated by the attempt of Mr. Joe L. Allbritton to acquire
control of Riggs National Bank in Washington, D.C. with a tender offer at a premium of
approximately 40% over market price which would give him 35% of the outstanding shares,
New York Times, February 10, 1981, § D (Business), at 3, col. 1, February 13, 1981, [§ D
(Business), at 3 col. 1.] (All New York Times citations are to the Late City Edition.) The bank
filed a lawsuit against Mr. Allbritton in the federal district court in Washington which issued a
preliminary injunction delaying the offer, Wall Street Journal, March 18, 1981, at 10, col. 4.
Later the bank announced that it had reached a settlement with Mr. Allbritton and that it
would end its opposition to the tender offer in court and before the Bank Regulatory Agencies.
Wall Street Journal, March 24, 1981 at 22, col. 2. (All Wall Street Journal citations are to the
Eastern Edition.) Approval by the Comptroller of the Currency is necessary before the tender
offer can become effective. A recent domestic Canadian example was the attempt by Campeau
Corp. to acquire control of Royal Trustco Ltd. which was frustrated when "friends" of Royal
Trustco acquired sufficient shares to defeat the offer, Wall Street Journal, February 2, 198 1, at
19, col. 6, March 23, 1981, at 4, col. I. Two other interesting recent examples of political and
social concern about the sale of important companies in a politically sensitive industry
(national newspapers) are the sales of Times Newspapers and the Observer in London.
Neither of the buyers was a foreigner although concern had been expressed about the possibil-
ity that Times Newspapers might possibly be acquired by a foreigner. Financial Times, Janu-
ary 28, 1981, at 1, 7, col. 4, February 26, 1981, at I, col. 3, February 27, 1981, at 8, col. 2. (All
Financial Times citations are to the Daily Edition published in London and Frankfurt.); New
York Times, March 2, 1981, § D (Business), at i, col. 3; Wall Street Journal, February 27,
1981, at 26, col. 5; see also Johnson, "Tiny" Rocks the Boat, March 7, 1981, SPECTATOR 17.
4The New York Times, March 28, 1980, § D (Business), at 10, col. 5. Sindona's conviction
was recently affirmed by the Court of Appeals, United States v. Sindona, 1980 FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 97,732 (2d Cir. 1980). There is no lack of counterexamples of domestic defraud-
ers. In October 1973, United States National Bank in San Diego was declared insolvent
because of loan losses caused by its chief executive officer and principal shareholder, C.
Arnholt Smith, and as a consequence, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ultimately
paid out over $200 million to protect depositers. Wall Street Journal, March 4, 1981, at 26,
col. 1. More recently Wells Fargo Bank in California was the victim of a large employee fraud
although neither principal officers nor shareholders were involved. New York Times, Febru-
ary 23, 1981, at I, col. 3, March 20, 1981, at 1, col. I; Wall Street Journal, March 4, 1981, at 1,
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Whatever one may think of the empirical basis for the justifications, the
political implications of foreign bank acquisitions are clearly very serious.
There is a political limit on how much foreign bank ownership the United
States can permit, and ownership by acquisition rather than by new invest-
ment poses the problem in its most controversial form. Lest we should,
unintentionally, appear to be painting a picture of a jingoish, restrictive
United States, we would like to make it clear that United States policy in
this regard is far less restrictive than the policies of European countries.
Can one imagine one of the largest commercial banks in the United King-




In discussing the principal legal steps which must be taken to acquire a
United States bank, this article will assume that a foreign bank holding
company (Parent) has organized a wholly-owned subsidiary (Buyer) under
the laws of the state of Delaware (a state where many large United States
corporations are organized), to purchase for cash from a publicly held cor-
poration (usually also organized in Delaware) (Seller) all of the stock
(Shares) it owns of its subsidiary bank (Bank).6
1. FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD APPROVAL REQUIRED
The Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 (Act)7 prohibits any "com-
pany" (which includes corporations and partnerships but excludes individ-
uals) from becoming a bank holding company without the prior approval of
col. 6, at 26, col. 1. Furthermore, if the public in the United States were to generally look upon
foreign bankers as potential defrauders, foreign bankers would have to quickly overcome this
perception or else risk losing the value of their investments through loss of deposits, fiduciary
accounts and other bank business. The limited empirical studies on the subject do not support
the view that United States banks suffer from foreign ownership. Report by the Comptroller
General of the United States, pp. iii-v, chapters 3, 4 (GGD-80-66, August 26, 1980).
'As an example of foreign restrictions on foreign acquisitions by United States Banks, it was
reported recently that under pressure from large Spanish banks, the Bank of Spain refused
permission to Citibank to buy certain Spanish finance companies, Financial Times, March 10,
1981, at 19, col. 2.
'There may also be situations where it is advantageous for the bank holding company itself
to be acquired, either by a merger of Buyer into Seller or a merger of Seller into Buyer. For
example, this may allow the Buyer to benefit from prior United States tax losses of the Seller
or the Parent may desire to acquire non-bank assets of the Seller. Except under special cir-
cumstances, it is unlikely that the Buyer will make a tender offer for the publicly held shares of
Seller. See pp. 387-88 infra.
United States banks are either organized under the banking laws of one of the 50 states (a
state bank) or under federal law (a national bank). The applicable law may impose require-
ments of significance to the Buyer. For example, directors of a national bank must be United
States citizens, provided that, in the case of a national bank which is a subsidiary or affiliate of
a foreign bank, the Comptroller of the Currency may in his discretion waive this requirement
in the case of a minority of the directors. 12 U.S.C. § 72.
'12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-49.
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the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Board).8 A com-
pany is a "bank holding company" if it "controls" a United States bank.9
Control is deemed to exist when a company owns or controls, directly or
indirectly, 25 percent or more of any class of voting stock and may be
deemed to exist in other situations. 10 (Usually the ownership of less than 5
percent of such stock will not be deemed "control.") Accordingly, both the
Buyer and the Parent would have to obtain approval of the Board before
the Buyer acquired 25 percent (or, depending upon the circumstances, more
than 5 percent) of any class of voting stock of the Bank.
In general, the Act prohibits a United States controlled bank holding
company from owning non-banking assets. I I Consequently, a United
States conglomerate could not acquire a United States bank. Non-bank
related activities are deemed to include the activities of a securities broker,
investment banker or underwriter.
However, a foreign bank holding company which is principally engaged
in the banking business outside the United States (i.e., more than one-half
of its business--disregarding its United States banking-is banking and
more than one-half of its banking business is outside the United States), or
is otherwise specifically authorized by the Board, is permitted to acquire a
United States bank even though it may also, among other things, (i) engage
in direct activities of any kind outside the United States, (ii) engage in
direct activities in the United States that are incidental to its activities
outside the United States and (iii) own stock of any company that is not
engaged in any activities in the United States except as are incidental to the
international or foreign business of such company. 12 This allows foreign
banks and bank holding companies, many of which traditionally engage in
812 U.S.C. § 1842(a). The Change in Bank Control Act of 1978, which excludes acquisitions
by companies because they are already regulated by the Act, requires individuals seeking to
acquire control of a bank to give the appropriate federal bank regulatory agency 60 days'
notice of the proposed acquisition. 12 U.S.C. § 18170). The agency may disapprove of such
acquisition if it would substantially lessen competition, result in a banking monopoly in any
part of the United States, jeopardize the financial stability of the bank or otherwise be contrary
to the interests of the bank to be acquired. It is likely that an attempt by a foreign individual
to acquire a United States bank would be allowed only in unusual circumstances, e.g., if the
only alternative were to close the bank.
The direct activities of foreign banks, acting in the United States through branches and
agencies, were not subject to federal banking laws, until the enactment of the International
Banking Act of 1978. See generally Symposium, Regulation of Foreign Banks in the United
States, 1980 U. OF ILL. L.F. number I. This statute attempted to subject those activities to
substantially the same treatment as if they were activities of United States banks. However,
this statute did not necessarily eliminate the advantages that a foreign acquirer has over its
United States competitor in acquiring a United States bank, as is explained in this article. See
pp. 372-73 infra.
'12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1).
°U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2); 12 C.F.R. § 225.2.
'12 U.S.C. § 1843. However, a bank holding company may engage in bank-related activi-
ties directly or through subsidiaries and may own shares of any company which do not consti-
tute more than 5% of the outstanding voting shares of such company. 12 U.S.C. § 1843(c); 12
C.F.R. § 225.4.
.212 U.S.C. § 1843(c)(9); 12 C.F.R. § 225.4(g); 211.23(0(1).
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investment banking and other securities businesses and own non-bank
related assets, to buy a United States bank without divesting their other
businesses and assets. This standard also reflects the Board's policy that
only foreign organizations with considerable banking experience should be
permitted to acquire United States banks.
The Act prohibits a company from owning a bank in more than one
state) 3 When this restriction is combined with the restrictions of the anti-
trust laws, it is unlikely that a large United States bank holding company or
bank could acquire control of any other United States bank. On the other
hand, a foreign bank (or other foreign company) which did not control a
United States bank or have a United States branch or agency,' 4 would not
be subject to the geographical restrictions of the Act and would not be
likely to have any antitrust problem.' 5
In 1979, the Board approved the following bank acquisitions by foreign
bank holding companies: the acquisition of Union Bank, Los Angeles, Cal-
ifornia (Union Bank), by Standard Chartered Bank Limited (Standard);16
the acquisition of Marine Midland Banks, Inc., Buffalo, New York
",12 U.S.C. § 1842(d). An out-of-state acquisition is permitted only if the laws of that state
expressly allow it, and there are no state laws which permit such acquisitions. A few states
(e.g., Delaware, Maine and South Dakota) have recently enacted laws which permit out-of-
state bank holding companies to form local banks, provided those banks do not compete for
local retail business. The principal attractions of these laws are lower tax rates and higher
permitted interest rates on consumer credit.
'If the foreign entity controlled a United States bank, it would be a United States bank
holding company and therefore subject to the geographical restrictions of the Act. In addition,
the International Banking Act of 1978 prohibits a foreign bank which has a United States
branch or agency from acquiring control of a bank in another state. 12 U.S.C. § 3103(a).
However, if the foreign entity wished to acquire a bank in another state, it could dispose of its
bank, branch or agency. For example, Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation dis-
posed of its controlling interest in the Hong Kong Bank of California before applying for
approval to acquire Marine Midland Bank. See note 17 infra.
"The General Accounting Office believes that foreign acquisitions of United States banks
should be prohibited (except for the acquisition of small or troubled banks) until this competi-
tive unfairness has been eliminated or alleviated. See note 77 infra. On the other hand, the
federal bank regulatory agencies believe that no such prohibition should be imposed. See
notes 79 and 80 infra.
In January, 1981, the Carter Administration issued a report which concluded that the pres-
ent restrictions of the Act on interstate banking are "increasingly ineffective, inequitable, inef-
ficient and anachronistic," and urged a gradual easing of these restraints. Introduction and
Recommendations in White House Staff Report on the McFadden Act which Restricts Interstate
Branching by Banks. Daily Report for Executives, Bureau of National Affairs, January 2,
1981, pp. B-1, B-7. Among other things, it pointed out that the "public interest is not well
served by a system which effectively limits to foreign institutions the opportunity to acquire or
merge with many domestic banks." (p. B--4). However, the prospect of any liberalizing legis-
lation in the near future is very uncertain. For example, in commenting on this report, Rep.
Fernand J. St. Germain, the new Chairman of the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs
Committee, stated that "interstate branching, to understate the case, is a highly emotional,
highly charged issue" and that there were "serious questions about the possibility of mustering
a consensus for substantive change." American Banker, January 5, 1981, at 1, col. 1. This
highly emotional issue is caused by the self-interest which one would expect from any group
which has a monopolistic advantage based on law and is skillfully combined with populist
economics.
"
6Order dated March 16, 1979, 65 Fed. Res. Bull. 350 (1979).
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(Marine), by Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (Hong
Kong);17 the acquisition of National Bank of North America, Jamaica,
New York (NBNA), by National Westminster Bank Limited (NatWest);18
and the acquisition of LaSalle National Bank, Chicago, Illinois (LaSalle),
by Algemene Bank, Nederland, N.V. (Algemene). 19 During the period
March 31, 1980 to July 1, 1980, there was a legislative moratorium on the
acquisition of large United States banks by foreign persons20 which has not
been extended.2 '
2. CRITERIA FOR BOARD APPROVAL
There are three criteria for Board approval: (a) antitrust considerations,
(b) financial and managerial resources, and (c) convenience and needs of
the community.22
(a) Antitrust
The Act provides that the Board not approve any acquisition which
would substantially lessen competition unless it finds that the anti-competi-
tive effects are outweighed by the probable effect of the acquisition in meet-
ing the conveniences and needs of the community. In addition, before an
application is approved, it must be referred to the United States Depart-
ment of Justice for its opinion on any anti-competitive implications of the
acquisition.
The initial question is whether the Board may employ standards for judg-
ing the possible anti-competitive effect of an acquisition that are more strict
than the standards generally contained in the antitrust laws to determine
the lawfulness of an acquisition, or, in other words, whether the Board may
deny approval for an acquisition absent a finding of an antitrust violation.
This issue has been the subject of some dispute. The board has taken the
position that adverse anti-competitive effects, even if they would not be
otherwise condemned under the antitrust laws, are nevertheless relevant to
the determination by the Board to grant or withdraw approval for an acqui-
sition.
However, in Washington Mutual Savings Bank v. FDIC,2 3 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that, under the Bank Merger Act, an
agency (in that case, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) does not
have authority to apply a standard more stringent than the antitrust laws,
and to deny, solely on competitive grounds, an acquisition that would not
violate the antitrust laws. The decision in Washington Mutual was recently
"
7Order dated March 16, 1979, 65 Fed. Res. Bull. 354 (1979).
"Order dated March 16, 1979, 65 Fed. Res. Bull. 357 (1979).
'
9Order dated July 13, 1979, 65 Fed. Res. Bull. 658 (1979).
"See pp. 388-391 infra.
21Id.
2212 U.S.C. § 1842(c).
21482 F.2d 459 (9th Cir. 1973).
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followed by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in County National
Bancorporation and TGB Co. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System 24 and by the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Mercantile
Texas Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.25 For the
present, therefore, the standards imposed by the courts for determining the
lawfulness of a bank acquisition under the antitrust laws are apparently
binding upon the Board.
Normally, foreign acquirers should have little difficulty satisfying the
antitrust criterion, particularly if the foreign acquirer does not have, prior
to the acquisition, significant banking activities in the United States. Possi-
ble antitrust problems are related to two factors: (1) the extent to which the
foreign acquirer performs banking functions in the United States prior to
the acquisition; and (2) the extent to which the foreign acquirer may be
viewed as one of a few potential entrants into a concentrated market in the
United States. Thus, it has been noted that
[An acquisition by the foreign institution of a domestic bank is most likely to
raise significant competitive problems where the foreign bank already serves mar-
kets in which the offices of the bank to be acquired are located, or is one of a few
significant potential entrants into concentrated markets in which the bank to be
acquired holds a substantial position. This is equally true of acquisitions by
domestic banks. Moreover, as may be true of domestic acquisitions, a foreign
bank acquisition may have procompetitive effects.26
The application of these criteria to foreign acquirers is unlikely to present
serious problems except in unusual circumstances. If the foreign acquirer
and the bank to be acquired both have operations in the same geographical
area in the United States, the activities of each entity would have to be
significant before an antitrust question would arise.27 In the event that the
241980-81 Trade Cases 63, 726 (8th Cir. 1980), petition for rehearing granted, October 28,
1980.
25638 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1981).
26Testimony of Donald L. Flexner, [former] Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust
Division, Department of Justice, before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, United States Senate, Concerning Acquisitions of American Banks by Foreign Bank-
ing Institutions, July 16, 1979, p. 23. See generally Weiss, Competitive Standards Applied to
Foreign and Domestic Acquisitions of U.S. Banks, Winter 1980, THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN,
701; and Weiss, National Policies on Foreign Acquisitions ofBanks, 164 THE BANKERS MAGA-
ZINE 25 (198 1). It is quite possible that the new Reagan administration will be far less restric-
tive on antitrust grounds with regard to both domestic and foreign acquisitions. See New
York Times, February 13, 1981, § D (Business), at 2, col. 1, March 20, 1981, § D (Business), at
1, col. 1.
2 In a market that is not highly concentrated, that is, where the market shares of the four
largest firms amount to less than approximately 75%, the Merger Guidelines of the Depart-
ment of Justice, TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510, at 6884, state that the Department "will
ordinarily challenge" a merger where the shares of the firms involved exceed the following:
Either of the Firms The Other Firm
5% 5% or more
10% 4% or more
15% 3% or more
20% 2% or more
25% or more 1% or more
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foreign acquirer did not, prior to the acquisition, conduct banking activities
in the same area in the United States, questions would arise only if the
acquirer was one of a few potential entrants into the particular United
States market, if that market was concentrated, and if the bank sought to be
acquired was a substantial factor in that market. 28
In the case of each of the acquisitions approved in 1979, the Board con-
cluded that the increased market share of the combined institution was not
significant. Union Bank was the sixth largest banking organization in the
state of California and the fourth largest banking organization in the Los
Angeles metropolitan market, controlling less than 8 percent of the deposits
in commercial banks in that market; Marine was the seventh largest bank-
ing organization in the state of New York and the ninth largest banking
organization in the New York City market, controlling less than 3 percent
of the deposits in commercial banks in that market; NBNA was the thir-
teenth largest commercial bank in the state of New York and the eleventh
In a highly concentrated market, that is, where the market shares of the four largest firms
amount to approximately 75% or more, the Guidelines state that the Department "will ordi-
narily challenge" a merger where the shares of the firms involved exceed the following:
Either of the Firms The Other Firm
4% 4% or more
10% 2% or more
15% or more 1% or more28The Department of Justice Guidelines state that the Department "will ordinarily chal-
lenge" a merger between "one of the most likely entrants into the market" and
(i) any firm with approximately 25% or more of the market;
(ii) one of the two largest firms in a market in which the shares of the two largest firms
amount to approximately 50% or more;
(iii) one of the four largest firms in a market in which the shares of the eight largest firms
amount to approximately 75% or more, provided the merging firm's share of the market
amounts to approximately 10% or more; or
(iv) one of the eight largest firms in a market in which the shares of these firms amount to
approximately 75% or more, provided either (A) the merging firm's share of the market is not
substantial and there are no more than one or two likely entrants into the market, or (B) the
merging firm is a rapidly growing firm." TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 4510, at 6888.
It should be noted that, while these guidelines may be a guide to the Department's enforce-
ment intentions, they do not, unlike the guidelines set forth in the prior footnote, have a sound
basis in the cases decided by the courts. The number of cases that have been decided to date
under a potential competition theory is relatively small, and therefore the interpretation and
application of the potential competition theories is uncertain. Recently, in Mercantile Texas
Corp. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 638 F.2d 1255 (5th Cir. 1981), the
court of appeals described a potential competition theory as a "controversial doctrine whose
validity remains a current subject of debate" (638 F.2d 1255, at 1263) and discussed the exten-
sive findings that the Board would have to make to apply such a theory to a merger of two
Texas bank holding companies. Id. at 1267-1272. Moreover, the Supreme Court has rebuffed
various specific attempts by the Department of Justice to apply a potential competition theory
in the context of domestic bank mergers on the grounds that, inter alia, regulatory barriers to
ready entry into new markets "often significantly reduce, if they do not eliminate, the likeli-
hood that the acquiring bank is either a preceived potential de novo entrant or a source of
future competitive benefits through de novo or foothold entry." United States v. Marine Ban-
corporation, 418 U.S. 602, 630 (1974). See also United States v. Citizens & Southern National
Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1976); United States v. Connecticut National Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
See generally Austin, The Evolution of Commercial Bank Merger Antitrust Law, 36 Bus. LAW.
297 (1981).
Foreign Acquisitions of U.S. Banks 377
largest banking organization in the metropolitan New York City market,
controlling less than 2 percent of the deposits in commercial banks in that
market; and LaSalle was the sixth largest banking organization in the state
of Illinois and also the sixth largest banking organization in the Chicago
market, controlling less than 2 percent of the deposits in commercial banks
in that market. In each case, the acquiring foreign bank was not a major
factor in the relevant market.
(b) Financial and Managerial Resources
The Board may deny an application to form a bank holding company on
grounds of financial or managerial unsoundness even in the absence of
anti-competitive impact.29
The Board has stated that it expects a foreign bank holding company to
be a source of financial and managerial strength to its United States subsid-
iary bank.30
Satisfying these criteria should not present a problem to any of the major
foreign bank holding companies. Frequently, the Board expects that there
be an infusion of capital into the United States Bank at the time of the
acquisition, e.g., the $25 million additional capital which Standard invested
29Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System v. First Lincolnwood Corp. 439 U.S.
234 (1978). However, in a recent decision of the Ninth Circuit which may be inconsistent with
the First Lincolnwood case, it was held that the moral character of the controlling stockholders
of the proposed holding company is not a proper ground for denial unless it would cause the
bank or the holding company to be unsound or mismanaged. Security Bancorp, et al. v. Board
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System 1979-80 FED. BANKING L. REP. (CCH) 98,467
(9th Cir. 1980) (Board is not authorized to deny bank holding company application on ground
that the major stockholder was allegedly involved in giving bribes to foreign governments at a
time when such payments would not have violated any United States law and refused to give
the Board information concerning this allegation, because lack of good moral character is
relevant only if it would cause the bank or the holding company to be unsound or misman-
aged.)
3 [T]he Board believes that in general foreign banks seeking to establish banks or other
banking operations in the United States should meet the same general standards of strength,
experience and reputation as required for domestic organizers of banks and bank holding
companies. The Board also believes that foreign banks should meet on a continuing basis
these standards of safety and soundness if they are to be a source of strength to their United
States banking operations.
Whenever a foreign bank applies to become a bank holding company, the Board will seek
to assure itself of the foreign bank's ability to be a source of financial and managerial
strength and support to the United States subsidiary bank. In reaching this judgment, the
Board will analyze the financial condition of the foreign organization, evaluate the record
and integrity of management, assess the role and standing of the bank in its home country,
and request the view of the bank regulatory authorities in the home country. In connection
with its financial analysis, the Board will require sufficient information to permit an assess-
ment of the financial strength and operating performance of the foreign organization. Infor-
mation will consist of reports prepared in accordance with local practices together with an
explanation and reconciliation of major differences between local accounting standards and
United States generally accepted accounting procedures including full information on earn-
ings, capital, charge-offs and reserves.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Statement of Policy on Supervision and
Regulation of Foreign Bank Holding Company, February 23, 1979.
378 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
in Union Bank3' the $200 million additional capital which Hong Kong
invested in Marine, 32 the $25 million additional capital which NatWest
invested in NBNA, 33 and the $15 million additional capital which
Algemene Bank invested in the LaSalle National Bank.34 Indeed, such a
proposed infusion can be a strong inducement to the Board to approve the
acquisition.
(c) Convenience and Needs of Community
It may also be necessary to show that the acquisition would result in new
or improved services being offered to the Bank's customers. For example,
the acquisition would permit the Bank to offer international banking serv-
ices in addition to its present activities. 35
3. APPROVAL PROCEDURE
To apply for Board approval, the Buyer and the Parent must each pre-
pare an application, which gives financial and corporate information about
the Buyer and the Parent, including information to enable the Board to
determine whether the acquisition would lessen competition or serve the
needs of the community and whether the foreign acquirer would be a
source of strength. Unless the Board otherwise determines, all information
is available to the public upon request. 36 The Board may afford confiden-
tial treatment for information if the applicant is able to establish that disclo-
sure would likely result in substantial competitive harm or would be an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.37
"Note 16 supra.
3"Note 17 supra.
"Note 18 supra.34Note 19 supra.
"For example, see orders cited supra n.16 at 352, n.17 at 355, n.18 at 359, and n.19 at 659.
3 Although the Freedom of Information Act generally requires that government agencies
make filings available to the public, there are various exceptions for which confidential treat-
ment may be requested including matters in reports to agencies which regulate financial insti-
tutions. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(8).
"If the acquisition is approved, thereafter the Buyer would be required to file an annual
report which sets forth extensive financial and corporate information about the Buyer and the
Bank. In addition, the Parent would be required to file an annual report which sets forth
extensive financial and corporate information about the Parent and each of its material subsid-
iaries (i.e., contributing 5% of gross operating income or net income, or representing 5% of the
Parent's consolidated capital accounts). The financial statements of foreign banking organiza-
tions are to be prepared in accordance with local accounting principles and practices in the
home country. See proposed Annual Report Form F.R. Y-7. In addition, a quarterly report
is required with respect to transactions between the Bank and the Buyer, the Parent or any
subsidiary of the Buyer or the Parent. See Form F.R. Y-8 and Form F.R. Y-Sf has become
effective. Confidential treatment may be requested for certain information as indicated above.
Various foreign regulators, including British, Swiss, Japanese and German, are attempting to
persuade the Board to reduce these disclosure requirements insofar as they relate to foreign
banks. They contend that these requirements violate their countries' sovereignty, often requir-
ing disclosures which are not made to the public in the home country, and may even violate
local law, and they raise the possibility of retaliation against United States banks. American
Banker, November 10, 1980, at 3, col. 3.
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After the application is complete (which is likely to be a prolonged pro-
cess, especially if the Bank is large and the acquirer is foreign), the Board
notifies the appropriate bank supervisory authority (i.e., the Comptroller of
the Currency in the case of a national bank and the appropriate state
agency in the case of a state bank) of the application and allows the bank
supervisory authority thirty days in which to submit its recommendation. If
the Board does not act on an application within ninety-one days after it has
a complete record on that application, the application is deemed
approved. 38 If approved, the Justice Department has thirty days for its
review. However, if necessary to prevent the probable failure of the Bank,
the Board may act immediately. 3
9
4. STATE LAW
If the Bank is organized under state law rather than federal law, the
acquisition may also have to be approved by the state bank regulatory
agency. For example, if the Bank is organized under Illinois law, the sale
must be approved by the Illinois Commissioner of Banks,40 and if the Bank
is organized under New York law, the sale must be approved by the New
York Superintendent of Banks.4 '
The need for state approval can be a difficult problem. For example, in
the case of the acquisition of Marine (which owned a large bank which
provided banking services to upper New York state as well as to the New
York metropolitan area) by Hong Kong, the New York Superintendent of
Banks would not approve the acquisition. The Superintendent's reasons
included the belief that (i) permitting the acquisition would be inconsistent
with the policy of the New York Banking Department which prohibited
large New York City banks from acquiring major upstate New York banks,
(ii) the acquisition by a foreign bank would reduce Marine's commitment to
the banking needs of upstate New York, and (iii) the inability, because of
differences in regulatory and accounting requirements between Hong Kong
and the United States, to evaluate the financial condition of Hong Kong or
to supervise adequately potential conflicts of interest. 42 This regulatory
hurdle was overcome by the time-consuming step of first converting Marine
into a national bank. The approval of the New York Superintendent was
not required for either that conversion or the later acquisition by Hong
Kong.
3812 U.S.C. § 1842(b).
39
1d.
'Illinois Banking Act § 15(9), ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 16V/ § 15.
"New York Banking Act § 143-b.
"
2Schedule 14 D-i filed, in accordance with SEC regulations, February 1, 1980 by HSBC
Holdings B.V., pp. 19-20.
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5. RESTRICTIONS ON BUYER
If the Buyer obtains all necessary approvals and acquires the Bank, the
Buyer must comply thereafter with the same restrictions that apply to all
United States bank holding companies. For example, the Buyer and the
Bank must comply with the branch banking laws of the state where the
bank is located, cannot have a branch or another bank in any other state43
and cannot engage in non-banking business (which includes many of the
businesses of an investment banker and the ownership of stock in non-
banking businesses) in the United States.44 The Parent is subject to these
same restrictions, except that, as mentioned previously, the Parent can con-
tinue to conduct foreign non-bank activities.45
B. Form of Acquisition
1. USUAL FORM: PURCHASE OF SHARES FROM PARENT
Usually an acquisition negotiated with the board of directors of the Seller
(a "friendly" acquisition) is the only suitable alternative for the foreign
acquirer of a bank.46 Such an acquisition would normally be in the form of
a purchase of assets (i.e., the Shares of the Bank, and possibly other assets,
owned by the Seller) by the Buyer or a merger between the Buyer and
Seller.47
The sale of the Shares must be approved by the board of directors of the
Seller, which generally means that it must be approved by a majority of the
directors. Furthermore, if the Shares represent all or substantially all of the
assets of the Seller, which will usually be the case in the sale of a bank by a
bank holding company, the sale must also be approved by the Seller's
shareholders.48
An important problem in a friendly acquisition (whether the acquirer is a
United States company or foreign) is that the announcement of the pending
acquisition may attract other potential acquirers to make higher, or other-
wise more attractive, competing offers.49 In this situation the board of
" 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d).
"12 U.S.C. §§ 378(a)(1), 1843(a).45Note II at 372-73 supra.
"Because of the need for regulatory approval and the politically controversial nature of
foreign acquisitions of United States banks, it is very unlikely that an unfriendly acquisition of
a United States bank could occur. For example, see Wall Street Journal, March 14, 1979, at
10, col. 3, quoting the then Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem as stating that it would be highly unlikely that an unfriendly takeover of a United States
bank by a foreign entity would obtain the requisite United States bank regulatory approval.4
1With regard to the use of tender offers, see pp. 387-88 infra.
"See pp. 381-83 infra.
"'See Freund & Easton, The Three-Piece Suitor: An Alternative Approach to Negotiated Cor-
porate Acquisitions, 34 Bus. LAW. 1679, 1694 (1979); Fleischer & Sternberg, Corporate Acquisi-
dons, 12 REV. SEC. REG. 937 (1979). This problem is not limited to the United States. In the
United Kingdom, for example, Racal Electronics recently entered into a friendly acquisition
with the board of directors of Decca. After this acquisition was announced, Bntish General
Electric made a superior competing offer, forcing Racal to increase its offer in order to prevail.
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directors of the Seller would have great difficulty in refusing, or in urging
shareholders of the Seller to refuse, a more attractive offer because of legal
rules regulating the fiduciary conduct of the Seller's directors. 50 Moreover,
in the case of a bank, the competing offer may be much more attractive
from the standpoint of the bank regulatory agencies, for example, because
the offeror has a much better banking record and would make a larger capi-
tal contribution to the bank.
It is very doubtful whether this problem could be solved by a definitive
acquisition agreement between the Buyer and the Seller's management
even if one could be signed quickly. Because of federal securities law and
stock exchange publicity requirements, it would be very difficult to sign a
definitive acquisition agreement before the publicly held Seller must make
a public announcement of the pending negotiations forced by sudden
increases in the price and volume of the Seller's shares. Often it is possible
to sign quickly a preliminary acquisition agreement (agreement in princi-
ple) describing the essential points in the transaction such as price and the
general nature of the representations and warranties that will be required in
the final agreement. Such an agreement in principle provides little protec-
tion against competing offers because it must be conditional upon obtaining
all requisite regulatory approval (discussed on pp. 371-380, supra, and it
would usually also be conditional on obtaining director and stockholder
approval, the execution of a mutually satisfactory definitive agreement, and
possibly other matters.
Stockholder's approval is obtained by distributing to the Seller's stock-
holders a proxy statement which complies with SEC requirements for dis-
closure of financial and other information about the Seller.5' A proxy
statement is necessary because state corporation statutes require approval
by the Seller's shareholders of a sale of all or substantially all of its assets or
a merger. 52 The proxy statement must be filed with the SEC in a prelimi-
nary version and cannot be distributed until 10 days have elapsed without
comment, or notice that there will be comment, from the SEC staff. In an
acquisition the staff should be expected to comment, which usually takes in
the neighborhood of twenty-five days. If for any reason the acquisition is
controversial the time required for comments may be much longer. Some
additional time is usually required to satisfy these comments, and the meet-
ing cannot be held until at least twenty days after the final version of the
See Wall Street Journal, February 19, 1980, at 16, col. 2; Financial Times, February 15, 1980,
at 1, col. 7.
'
0 Directors of United States corporations do not have an obligation to accept an offer simply
because it is made at a premium over market price. However, once a board of directors has
accepted an offer, it is much more difficult to find convincing reasons for refusing another offer
at a higher price. See Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to
Resist Tender Offers, op cit., supra note 1; Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35
Bus. LAW. 101 (1979).
"SEC requirements are applicable if the Seller has at least 500 shareholders. Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 12(9), 14(a).
"See, e.g., Del. Gen. Corp. L. §§ 251(c), 271(a).
382 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
proxy statement has been mailed to the Seller's shareholders. An optimistic
estimate for the time necessary to accomplish all of these requirements is
ninety days from the day the parties make a public announcement of the
proposed acquisition, and a best estimate is in the neighborhood of 120
days if there are no unexpected problems.53 Moreover, as mentioned previ-
ously, it is likely that regulatory approval of a bank acquisition will take
considerably longer, although shareholder approval could be obtained first
with effectiveness conditional on regulatory approval.54 If a better offer
from the point of view of either the Bank or the Seller's stockholders is
made during the period it may be difficult or impossible to obtain regula-
tory approval even if a definitive agreement has been signed and approved
by the Seller's shareholder.
During the waiting time before shareholder and regulatory approval,
competing offers can be made. If a competing offer is made, the board of
directors of the Seller would have a legal obligation under state corporation
law and SEC proxy rules to explain the nature of the competing offer in the
proxy statement. Even if a competing offer is made after the proxy state-
ment has been mailed, the board. of directors of the Seller would probably
have an obligation to inform the shareholders of the existence of a superior
offer before they voted.5 5 In practical effect, if the competing offer is clearly
superior the Buyer would have no alternative but to improve its own offer
or to withdraw its original offer and allow the Seller to go ahead with the
competing offer. Moreover, as we have said, a superior offer, even after
shareholder approval has been obtained, might as a practical matter make
it difficult or impossible to obtain regulatory approval.
A preliminary (and definitive) acquisition agreement provides much
more protection for the Buyer if the Seller has one or more large sharehold-
ers (in the case of large publicly held bank holding companies, not common
but possible) and they also agree to be bound by the agreement, subject to
obtaining regulatory approval. Preliminary arrangements with sharehold-
ers must be handled very cautiously to avoid having these arrangements
subsequently characterized by a court as a "tender offer" which would be
illegal because it would have been made without compliance with the
tender offer rules.56 An illegal tender offer can be difficult and expensive to
untangle. If these shareholders own significantly less than 50 percent of the
outstanding stock of the Seller, even a preliminary agreement would not
"See Freund & Easton, supra, note 49, at 1690 (3 to 4 months delay from time deal is
announced to closing).
"The Offer to Purchase for Cash dated July 21, 1980, in connection with the proposed
acquisition of control of Crocker National Corporation by Midland Bank Limited, estimates
(at p. 15) that the approval process will take 9 to 18 months.
"The board of directors of a corporation and any controlling shareholders have a fiduciary
duty to the corporation's shareholders which requires them to take all reasonable steps to
protect the shareholders' interests. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del.
1977).
"
6See Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
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provide complete protection against a competing offer. The exact amount
of large shareholder ownership required for safety depends in part on the
law of the state in which the Seller is organized. Delaware requires major-
ity shareholder approval for a negotiated acquisition unless there is a con-
trary provision in the company's charter.5 7 Some other states require a two-
thirds vote of the outstanding shares for approval. 58 Special charter provi-
sions requiring a higher percentage vote have become common in recent
years as a protection against "unfriendly" tender offers59 but they do not
usually apply. to transactions negotiated by the board of directors, and are
usually not found in charters of large bank holding companies because the
legal restrictions against acquisitions by other United States bank holding
companies and non-banking corporations and the requirements for prior
regulatory approval make unfriendly tender offers very unlikely.
It is conceivable that the Buyer could buy sufficient stock in the Seller
directly from the Seller itself to give the Buyer a preferred position in the
negotiation of an acquisition. Since the Seller is a bank holding company,
this would have to be less than twenty-five percent (and possibly less than
five percent) of the Seller's outstanding shares, because otherwise regula-
tory approval would be required for the sale.60 Moreover, such a maneuver
might be vulnerable to legal attack unless the Seller unambiguously
required the additional capital for some pressing business purpose. Under
some circumstances, the sale of shares for the purpose of providing protec-
tion against competing offers might be a breach of fiduciary obligation by
the Seller's board of directors6' and could be attacked in a shareholder suit
by a shareholder of the Seller, by the SEC for failure to disclose the true
purpose of the sale of shares, or possibly by a company which desires to
"Del. Gen. Corp. L. §§ 25 1(c), 27 1(a).
"Eg., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 32, §§ 157.64, 157.72.
"See ARANOW, EINHORN & BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPO-
RATE CONTROL 193-96 (1977); Buford, Amending the Corporate Charter, 32 Bus. LAW. 1353
(1977); Yoran,Advance Defense Tactics Against Takeover Bids, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 531 (1973);
Mullaney, Guarding Against Takeovers-Defense Charter Provisions, 25 Bus. LAW. 1441
(1970).
'See text at note 10 supra.
"Recent cases, however, indicate that in some situations directors may sell shares or assets
to a third party during a battle for control of the company as long as they do not themselves
have an interest in retaining control through such a sale: sale of shares to company making
competing offer, Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); sales of
assets, but sole or primary motivation of directors was not to retain control, Johnson v.
Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir., 1980); sale of assets calculated to protect the corporation and
its shareholders from injury, GM Sub Corp. v. Ligget Group Inc., 415 A.2d 473 (Del. Sup. Ct.
1980) See also Smith v. Pritzker, No. 6342 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 1981), preliminary injunction
denied where shares were issued to acquiring corporation at market price although acquisition
price was higher, but shares not voted at shareholder meeting called to approve acquisition. In
the case of sales of shares to protect an acquisition, it is not easy to determine the best rule for
society. Allowing the sale encourages acquisitions at a premium which should be good for
stockholders who receive the premium and for society because of the improved allocation of
resources. Prohibiting the sale could often result in higher prices for stockholders because
competition for acquisitions is fostered and could on the average result in an even better allo-
cation of resources.
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make a competing offer.62 Under both state and federal law, the Buyer and
the Parent could be considered participants in the violation and would very
likely be joined as defendants in any such lawsuit.
2. PAYMENT: CASH OR SECURITIES
As a practical matter, foreign acquisitions usually involve cash rather
than an exchange of securities. Because of lack of information and higher
transaction costs, United States stockholders generally prefer cash to for-
eign securities, unless the foreign securities are listed on a United States
stock exchange. There are also important legal problems associated with
the issuance of securities in the United States. If an exchange of securities
is used, the foreign issuer must file a registration statement for the securities
under the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act);63 and if the securities will be
listed on a United States stock exchange (or, in some circumstances, if they
will be widely held by United States residents), the foreign issuer must also
register the securities under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934
Act).64
Registration statements under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act must com-
ply with detailed disclosure requirements of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and must include audited financial statements for at
least the three preceding years. 65 Foreign registrants under the 1933 Act
and the 1934 Act must comply with the periodic reporting requirements of
the 1934 Act. Until recently, these requirements were not onerous because
they were keyed to reports which the foreign issuer was required to make
with its home government, any stock exchange or its security holders. 66 But
now, foreign issuers must file annual reports that are more similar to those
"
2See, e.g., SEC v. Parkland Hosiery Co. 558 F.2d 1083 (2d Cir., 1977); Applied Digital
Data Systems v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145, 1158 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Condec Corp. v.
Lunkenheimer Co., 230 A.2d 769, 775-76 (Del. Ch. 1967).
63See Section 5 of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77e. See also Neutralizing the Regulatory Bur-
den:" The Use of Equity Securities by Foreign Corporate ,4cquirers, 89 YALE L.J. 1413, 1419-22
(1980), for a general discussion of the securities laws problems that a foreign acquirer using
securities would encounter. The registration under the 1933 Act and the trading in United
States markets of American depository receipts (ADR) have no bearing on the registration
problems which are being discussed. ADR's are issued and registered under the 1933 Act by
United States banks to make it easier to trade foreign securities in the United States market,
although banks are not treated as issuers of these foreign securities with regard to liability
under the 1933 Act. There is no requirement that the foreign issuer of the securities file a
registration statement under either the 1933 or 1934 Acts and in most instances the foreign
issuer has not filed a registration statement. See Form S-12 which is used by banks to register
ADR's, FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 8301, p. 7292; Moxley, The ADR: Instrument of Interna-
tional Finance and a Tool oArbitrage, 8 VILL. L. REV. 19, 20 (1962).
- 15 U.S.C. § 78a et seq. See § 12 of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 781, and the regulations
promulgated thereunder, particularly Rule 12g3-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2.
"See Items 25-27 of Schedule A of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77aa(25)-(27) and Forms S-I
and S-7 promulgated under the 1933 Act. See also §§ 12(b)(l)(J) - 12(b)(I)(L) of the 1934
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 781 (b)(1)(J) - 781(b)(l)(L), and Form 10 promulgated thereunder.
'Some North American and other foreign issuers are for SEC purposes treated like United
States issuers because they are closely connected with the United States. See, e.g., SEC Rule
12g3-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3- 2 .
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filed by United States registrants. Interim reporting requirements are still
keyed to reports filed by the foreign issuer with its home government, but
reports which go to its shareholders and material press releases must be
translated into English. 67 Listing securities on United States stock
exchanges would also subject a foreign issuer to stock exchange disclosure
requirements such as sending annual financial reports to shareholders, pub-
lishing quarterly financial statements, and promptly releasing important
information about the issuer to the public in the United States through
financial wire services and newspapers.
Although many foreign issuers (and United States subsidiaries) have reg-
istered securities under the 1933 and 1934 Acts and successfully complied
with the requirements for audited financial statements, a foreign issuer
which has not previously filed a registration statement can expect some
delay while resolving with the SEC staff any differences between foreign
and United States accounting rules.68 The extensive disclosures required
by registration statements and reporting requirements under the 1933 and
1934 Acts and stock exchange rules could present foreign banks unused to
making such extensive public disclosures about themselves with a serious
basic policy problem.69 A foreign issuer which files a registration statement
under the 1933 or 1934 Acts could also become subject to the foreign brib-
ery and accounting provisions of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which
could be an important additional burden for some issuers although this
burden may be lessening.70
Theoretically, the use of cash rather than securities for an acquisition
could place foreign acquirers at a disadvantage. The use of cash alone for
an acquisition would make it impossible to make the acquisition a tax-free
reorganization or an installment sale under United States tax law.7 1 A tax-
free reorganization would permit the shareholders of the Seller to postpone
(or possibly to avoid completely) the tax on any gain received through the
exchange of stock because under the rules governing tax-free reorganiza-
tions there is no gain realized until the stock received in the exchange is
sold.72 An installment sale would make postponement of the tax possible
until payments are received.
6 7See SEC Rule 12b-12(d), 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-12(d). See generally Stephens, Foreign
Issuer Disclosures, 9 REV. SEC. REG. 893 (1976), describing the disclosure requirements for
foreign companies before the recent rule changes.
"Foreign and American accounting standards are significantly different. Financial Times,
February 20, 1980, at 13, col 1.
"'However, even if the acquisition is for cash, foreign acquirers of banks have special
problems because the rules of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System require
the Parent to file extensive material about itself. See note 37 supra.
"°The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act comprises §§ 13(b) and 30A of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 78m(b) and 78dd-l.
7 See Freund & Easton, note 49 supra.
"
2Voting stock of a foreign corporation can usually be used to accomplish a tax-free reorgan-
ization. One exception is a "statutory merger" directly with the foreign corporation itself pur-
suant to Section 378(a)(l)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code, which because of the definition of
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These impediments to the use of shares by a foreign acquirer, however,
will not usually be an important handicap, unless the Seller is controlled by
some large individual shareholders who may be particularly interested in a
tax-free sale or in postponement of the tax under the installment rules.
Making an acquisition tax-free is no longer as significant as it once was.
Recent amendments to the United States tax law have lowered the maxi-
mum tax on capital gains to 28 percent, substantially less than the rate of
almost 50 percent in effect before these amendments. More reductions are
promised by President Reagan. Many large institutional stockholders are
tax exempt or prefer to be free to sell and, therefore, do not value highly the
tax postponement available in a tax-free reorganization. Arbitrageurs usu-
ally acquire large amounts of stock in the company which is being acquired
after the proposed acquisition is announced (and frequently to the chagrin
of the SEC staff a short time before any announcement despite very strict
legal restrictions against the use of "insider" information for trading in pub-
licly held securities) and they are interested only in realizing cash from the
transaction as quickly as possible. For these reasons many large recent
United States acquisitions not involving foreigners have been for cash,
although this is subject to change when there are Federal Reserve Board
restrictions (or less formal pressures) against United States bank lending to
finance acquisitions or when stock prices appear to be so high that they
appear to be an attractive alternative to cash for both buyers and sellers.
"statutory merger" in the regulations must be effected "pursuant to the corporation laws of the
United States or a state or territory or the District of Columbia." See regulation
§ 1.368-2(b)(1). In any event, a merger directly between a foreign corporation and the
acquired corporation, even if allowed by the laws under which each corporation is organized,
would rarely be desirable because it would completely expose the foreign corporation to state
and federal regulation. A tax-free reorganization can be accomplished by a foreign corpora-
tion pursuant to Sections 368(a)(2)(D) and 368(a)(2)(E) of the Internal Revenue Code through
a merger between a United States subsidiary of the foreign corporation and the corporation
being acquired using voting stock of the foreign parent. This can be achieved despite the
requirement of Section 368(a)(2)(D) that this "transaction would have qualified under para-
graph I(A) if the merger had been into the controlling corporation . . ." See regulation
§ 1.368-2(b)(2); REV. RUL. 74-297, 1974-1 C.B. 84. Another form of tax-free reorganization
which can be used in accordance with Section 368(a)(1)(C) by a foreign corporation is the
acquisition of all or substantially all of the assets of the acquired corporation by the foreign
corporation or a subsidiary, using solely voting stock of the foreign parent, and the assumption
of the liabilities of the acquired corporation by the corporation making the acquisition. Stock
for stock exchanges (in substance a negotiated tender offer) using solely voting stock of the
foreign corporation are also possible under Section 368(a)(l)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code.
This is generally an undesirable form for the acquisition of a publicly held corporation
because it leaves an outstanding minority. Section 368(a)(I)(B) can also be used to accomplish
a stock-for-stock exchange in the form of a merger of a subsidiary of a foreign corporation into
the acquired corporation (a reverse (B) reorganization), which eliminates the problem of a
minority interest. See Rev. Rul. 67-448, 1967-2 C.B. 144. In certain situations, a ruling must
be obtained under Section 367(a) of the Internal Revenue Code for a tax-free reorganization in
which a foreign corporation or its stock is involved to assure that the reorganization "is not in
pursuance of a plan having as one of its principal purposes the avoidance of Federal income
taxes." In addition, there may be situations where some tax is generated even though the
transaction qualifies as a tax-free reorganization. See also 89 YALE L.J. 1413, 1417-19 note 63
srupra.
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3. TENDER OFFER FOR STOCK OF SELLER
In addition to acquiring the Seller's assets or acquiring the Seller by
merger, it would be theoretically possible to accomplish an unfriendly
acquisition by acquiring the Seller's outstanding stock by a cash tender
offer (conceivably even a registered exchange offer using stock or other
securities of the foreign acquirer) made directly to the Seller's stockholders.
As previously pointed out, it is, as a practical matter, very unlikely that an
unfriendly foreign acquisition of a United States bank could obtain the req-
uisite regulatory approval for a successful outsome.73 Moreover, if it
appeared likely that approval would be obtained, the enactment of new
legislation in time to defeat the tender offer (particularly for a very large
bank) would be a serious possibility.
However, tender offers are sometimes used in connection with friendly
acquisitions of publicly held companies because they are faster than merg-
ers or asset purchases and, therefore, provide somewhat more protection
against the possibility of competing offers. But this consideration is not
applicable to the acquisition of the stock of a bank holding company
because substantial delays are inevitable before obtaining the required reg-
ulatory approvals.74 Nevertheless, there have been at least two instances of
friendly tender offers having been made by a foreign bank for a United
States bank. The acquisition of Marine by Hong Kong mentioned previ-
ously, was accomplished in part by a tender offer. Hong Kong acquired
approximately 25 percent of the stock of Marine by a tender offer at $25 per
share and 26 percent directly from Marine at a price of $35.42 per share.
Hong Kong agreed not to purchase any additional shares of Marine for five
years and then only if a majority of the other stockholders agreed.
The proposed acquisition by Midland Bank Limited (Midland) of shares
of Crocker National Corporation. (Crocker), which owns the twelfth largest
bank in the United States, is also in part by a friendly tender offer with a
structure similar to the Marine offer. Midland has made a tender offer for
less than 50 percent of the outstanding shares of Crocker for a formula
price of not more than $50 per share and has agreed to buy additional
newly issued shares from Crocker at a price of $90 per share, so that when
the transaction is completed Midland will own approximately 57 percent of
the outstanding shares of Crocker. The Midland tender offer states that it is
conditional upon regulatory approval and the approval of a definitive
agreement by the boards of directors and shareholders of both Midland and
Crocker, that it is being made at this time because rules of the Securities
and Exchange Commission require that a tender offer be made within five
business days of the announcement, that the shareholders of Crocker are
urged not to tender any shares until after regulatory approval is obtained,
7'Note 46 supra.
74See 378-380 and note 54 supra.
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and that shares tendered may be withdrawn at any time prior to purchase.75
In the case of both of these tender offers, there will continue to be a sub-
stantial percentage of shares of the acquired bank holding company owned
by the public, which is usually very undesirable for the acquirer for both
economic and legal reasons. This arrangement enables the remaining
stockholders to benefit from the majority stockholder's ideas and capital,
creates possible conflicts of interest situations for the majority stockholder
and corresponding constraints for the acquired bank, and keeps the
acquired holding company subject to continued registration under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. On the other hand, this structure affords
some obvious benefits to the acquired bank and its shareholders. The
shareholders who wish to sell are afforded an opportunity (but not forced)
to sell at a price which represents a premium over the then market, and the
bank obtains substantial additional equity at an even higher premium for
strengthening and expanding its business. This large capital contribution at
a high premium to the bank may be viewed by the bank regulatory authori-
ties favorably as financial and political justifications for approving the
acquisition. Nevertheless, a conventional purchase of all the stock of the
bank, together with a capital infusion into the bank, should have satisfied
these bank regulatory objectives. The most reasonable guess is that the
acquisition structure used in these two cases was designed primarily to sat-
isfy the requirements of the acquired banks' managements to remain as
independent forces in the banks. Whether the Crocker shareholders would
have chosen this form instead of a higher price (between $50 and $90) for
all the outstanding Crocker shares is impossible to say. Normally it would
not be the preferred structure for the acquisition from the standpoint of the
acquirer.
Is it desirable from an economic point of view that unfriendly foreign
tender offers for United States banks are unlikely to succeed? There is
almost no disagreement that tender offers serve a very useful economic pur-
pose for target stockholders and for society, although it is also clear that in
many instances resistance by the target's management also accomplishes a
useful economic purpose for the target's shareholders and for society by
obtaining a much higher price for the shareholders and a better allocation
of resources for society.76 However, the economic case for unfriendly for-
eign tender offers for banks is different and weaker than the case for tender
offers in general. The present structure of United States bank law effec-
tively eliminates as competitors either in negotiated transactions or by
tender offer large domestic banks and other corporations which are the best
"Obviously, tendering for stock of a bank holding company (or stock of a publicly held
bank) within 5 business days of the announcement is not ideal because of the long delay
involved in obtaining regulatory approval. See Offer to Purchase note 54 supra. The SEC rule
(17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2(b)) which forced this awkward early tender offer is poorly thought out
and can work out very badly in negotiated domestic transactions involving tender offers.
"6See the discussion and citations, note I supra.
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informed part of the market. By approving unfriendly foreign tender offers,
the United States would be taking another step in encouraging an alloca-
tion of banking resources which is less than optimum (although probably
better than the present one) at the expense of its own banking system and
for the benefit of foreign banks.
C. Moratorium
The acquisitions of Banks by foreign bank holding companies which
were approved by the Board in 1979, led to widespread (although possibly
poorly informed) concern that unless the laws regulating such acquisitions
were changed, a large percentage of United States banking would some day
be controlled by foreign persons to the detriment of the United States econ-
omy. In response to this concern and to allow time to consider such
changes, on March 31, 1980, the United States enacted a moratorium on
acquisitions of United States banks by foreign persons, which expired July
1, 1980, and was not extended. 7
7
Although the moratorium was not extended, there was considerable sup-
port for an extension. For example, the United States General Accounting
Office (an independent nonpolitical governmental agency which assists the
United States Congress) recommended that the moratorium be extended
77TITLE IX - FOREIGN CONTROL OF
UNITED STATE5 FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Definitions
SEC. 901. For purposes of this title-
(i) the term "domestic financial institution" means any bank, mutual savings bank, or
savings and loan association organized under the laws of any State or of the United States;
(2) the term "foreign person" means any foreign organization or any individual resident
in a foreign country or any organization or individual owned or controlled by such an
organization or individual; and
(3) the term "takeover" means any acquisition of the stock or assets of any domestic
financial institution if, after such acquisition, the amount of stock or assets held is 5 per
centum or more of the institution's stock or assets.
Moratorium
SEC. 902. The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Comptroller of the
Currency, the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board may not approve any application relating to the takeover
of any domestic financial institution by a foreign person until July 1, 1980, unless-
(1) such takeover is necessary to prevent the bankruptcy or insolvency of the domestic
financial institution involved;
(2) the application was initially submitted for filing on or before March 5, 1980;
(3) the domestic financial institution has deposits of less than $100,000,000;
(4) the application relates to a takeover of shares or assets pursuant to a foreign person's
intrafirm reorganization of its interests in a domestic financial institution, including specifi-
cally any application to establish a bank holding company pursuant to such reorganization;
(5) the application relates to a takeover of the assets or shares of a domestic financial
institution if such assets or shares are owned or controlled by a foreign person; or
(6) the application relates to the takeover of a domestic financial institution which is a
subsidiary of a bank holding company under an order to divest by December 31, 1980.
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 97-221
§ 901, 902, 94 Stat. 193 (1980).
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primarily because foreign banks had an unfair advantage over United
States banks in making acquisitions of United States banks. 78
The primary United States agencies which regulate banking opposed the
extensions of the moratorium, primarily because of the contribution which
foreign banks can make to strengthen troubled United States banks and the
general United States policy of free movement of trade and investment.79
7'Report by the Comptroller General of the United States, Despite Positive Effects, Further
Foreign Acquisitions of U.S. Banks Should Be Limited Until Policy Conflicts Are Fully
Addressed, August 26, 1980 concludes, in part:
Although it is generally agreed that the current level of U.S. banking assets under foreign
control is not too high, there is also a general concurrence that the situation bears watching
. . . These beliefs are based on the assumption that domestic-controlled banks may be, at
some future time, more sensitive to local business and government credit needs than foreign-
controlled banks. . . . As of December 1979, foreign investors held $202.5 billion in U.S.
banking assets. This accounted for 13.7 percent of the total U.S. banking assets...
Although a few well-publicized bank problems have been attributed to foreign investors
who gained control of U.S. banks, foreign investors have generally improved weak U.S.
banks and maintained the condition of financially strong U.S. banks they acquired...
There are several possible justifications for restricting foreign acquisitions of U.S. banks or
limiting all foreign banking in the U.S. However, GAO found only one-a basic unfair-
ness-to be compelling .... U.S. law allows some foreign banks the opportunity to buy
large domestic banks which U.S. banks are prevented from buying. Because this unfairness
results from a conflict among various policies, it will take time to resolve. However, until
the policy conflict is resolved, the unfairness should not be allowed to persist. Therefore,
GAO believes that a moratorium on future foreign acquisitions of U.S. banks with total
assets of $100 milllion or more is justified. This moratorium should continue until the basic
policy issues which have caused the unfair situation have been fully addressed. The morato-
rium should exclude foreign acquisitions necessary to prevent the bankruptcy or insolvency
of domestic banks. Digest ii-xii.
United States antitrust laws would usually prevent a large United States bank from acquiring
another bank in its same market area. Furthermore, the Act prohibits a United States bank
from acquiring control of a bank in another state unless the laws of that state permit the
acquisition. Act § 3(d). These two prohibitions have the effect of reducing the ways in which
United States banks can provide funds to a troubled bank. For example, when Citibank
invested money in Central National Bank of Chicago, Citicorp had to be satisfied with non-
voting stock and a 15 year non-transferable warrant to acquire voting stock, which warrant
could be exercised only if the law banning an out-of-state acquisition was changed. Also, the
injection of funds into the First Pennsylvania Corporation, the parent of the First Penn-
sylvania Bank, was made by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and a syndicate of 30
banks in the form of loans and warrants, in a manner which assured that no one bank could be
deemed to be in control of the First Pennsylvania Bank.
"
9For example, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System responded to the
recommendation of the GAO Report as follows:
As we understand it, the concern is that the anti-trust laws and the inter-State banking
restrictions working in tandem effectively exclude domestic organizations from certain
acquisitions and thus give a significant advantage to foreign purchasers. This situation is
most likely to occur in connection with acquisitions of large banks since most qualified in-
State purchasers would normally be excluded for competitive reasons and out-of-state pur-
chasers would be excluded because of inter-State restrictions. In these circumstances, an
acquisition by a foreign organization is occasionally the only feasible alternative.
Exclusion of in-State acquisitions in which severe anti-competitive effects are not clearly
outweighed by other public interest considerations remains appropriate public policy. From
a public policy point of view, it can be argued that entry of foreign parties has positive
competitive effects. A foreign acquirer is in most instances a new entrant into the U.S. and
its acquisition of an existing competitor brings a new competitive force into that market
without changing the number of competitors. An acquisition by a domestic bank, by defini-
tion, results in a diminution of the number of competitors in the United States.
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Similar views were expressed by the Comptroller of the Currency and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.80
Although the United States bank regulatory agencies believe that, in gen-
eral, the acquisition of United States banks by foreigners should not be
restricted, and that the present system of legal restrictions with regard to
potential domestic acquirers is justifiable, it would be unrealistic to assume
that they will not be affected by political pressure favoring restriction on
foreigners. For example, even the 1979 Board approvals of the acquisitions
of Union Bank, Marine and NBNA included the following statement: "In
arriving at this conclusion the Board also considered the proportion of
banking resources controlled by foreign-owned institutions in the markets
relevant to this proposal." 81
D. Margin Requirements
United States law regulates the amount of credit which may be extended
to purchase "margin stock" (i.e., stock registered on a United States securi-
ties exchange and certain other stock actively traded in the United States) if
the credit is to be directly or indirectly secured by any stock. 82 Therefore, if
the stock of the Bank were publicly owned, or if the Buyer were merging
with the Seller or tendering for the publicly held stock of the Seller, these
margin regulations would have to be complied with if the Buyer were bor-
rowing in the United States to finance part of the purchase price.83 How-
As the GAO report brings out clearly, there is no evidence that foreign ownership of
United States banks has been or is likely to be contrary to the interests of the U.S. Indeed,
an important finding of the report is that foreign investment has had a positive influence on
U.S. banks, notably in cases where foreign organizations have provided much needed
financial support to weakened, but not necessarily failing, U.S. institutions. That financial
support has significantly improved the financial strength and competitive vitality of the U.S.
banking organizations making them better able to serve the banking needs of their commu-
nities.
The Board does not believe that these acknowledged benefits should be foregone for an
indefinite period while fundamental domestic banking issues are debated. Moreover, a mor-
atorium on foreign investment would breach this country's tradition of free and open mar-
kets. Also, it might have adverse effects on other countries' policies toward free movements
of trade and investment. For these reasons, the Board opposes a reintroduction of a morato-
rium on foreign acquisitions of United States banks.
Id. Appendix XII.
' 
0 d., Appendix XIII and Appendix XIV.
"Supra note 16 at 351; supra note 17 at 355, and supra note 18 at 358.
8212 C.F.R. §§ 207, 220, 221 and 224. Direct security is a pledge of shares. Indirect security
is any restriction on sale or pledge of shares, unless the lender in good faith is not looking to
such shares for payment.
'"Program by the ABA Committee on Developments in Business Financing, The Impact of
the Federal Reserve Margin Regulations on Acquisition Financing, 35 Bus. LAW. 517 (1980);
Herzel and Rosenberg, Loans to Finance Tender Offers.- The Bank's Legal Problems, 96 BANK-
IN L.J. 676, 684 (1979).
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ever, if the loan were made by a foreign institution to the Parent, the
margin regulations might not be applicable.84
IV. Conclusions
In general, foreign acquisitions, like domestic acquisitions, have benefi-
cial economic effects for domestic stockholders and on the allocation of
domestic resources, although from a political point of view foreign control
of domestic corporations can be the cause of fears and tensions which are
undesirable although probably in many respects empirically unfounded. In
the case of banks, the economic effects of foreign acquisitions are more dif-
ficult to assess because the restrictions on competition from the best
informed part of the market, domestic banks and other domestic corpora-
tions, make the outcome economically less desirable from the standpoints
of both shareholders and society. Foreign acquisitions of banks are also
peculiarly sensitive politically although even here the concern may be in
good part unfounded. Unfriendly tender offers for banks are an unsuitable
form of acquisition because of the long delays imposed by present legal
regulations and are unlikely to succeed. Even if an unfriendly tender offer
could obtain regulatory approval, the target bank would have plenty of
time to arrange a friendly acquisition by another foreign bank. Further-
more, unfriendly tender offers would almost certainly lead to legislation
prohibiting or severely restricting foreign acquisitions of banks. The ideal
short-run solution from all points of view would probably be the elimina-
tion of all or most of the restrictions on domestic banks in making acquisi-
tions with no additional restrictive legislation on foreign acquisitions. 85
However, foreign acquisitions of United States banks is such a sensitive
subject that some restrictive legislation is likely (although probably undesir-
able on economic grounds) even if restrictions on acquisitions by domestic
banks are reduced or eliminated.
'Herzel and Rosenberg, Foreign Bank Loans to Finance Tender Offers for U.S. Companies,
62 CH. B. REC. 80 (1980). Also, legislation has been introduced recently in both houses of
Congress which would subject foreign investors to the margin requirements when they borrow
abroad to buy shares of United States companies. New York Times, January 28, 1981, § D
(Business), at 3, col. 2.
"
5See note 15 supra.
